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ABSTRACT
Various studies have empirically shown that the majority of Java
and Android appsmisuse cryptographic libraries, causing devastat-
ing breaches of data security. erefore, it is crucial to detect such
misuses early in the development process. e fact that insecure
usages are not the exception but the norm precludes approaches
based on property inference and anomaly detection.
In this paper, we present CrySL, a definition language that en-
ables cryptography experts to specify the secure usage of the cryp-
tographic libraries that they provide. CrySL combines the generic
concepts of method-call sequences and data-flow constraints with
domain-specific constraints related to cryptographic algorithms
and their parameters. We have implemented a compiler that trans-
lates a CrySL ruleset into a context- and flow-sensitive demand-
driven static analysis. e analysis automatically checks a given
Java or Android app for violations of the CrySL-encoded rules.
We empirically evaluated our ruleset through analyzing 10,001
Android apps. Our results show that misuse of cryptographic APIs
is still widespread, with 96% of apps containing at least one misuse.
However, we observed fewer of the misuses that were reported in
previous work.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Digital devices are increasingly storing sensitive data, which is
oen protected using cryptography. However, it is insufficient
to use secure cryptographic algorithms. A developer must also
know how to securely use such algorithms in their code. Unfor-
tunately, prior studies suggest that this is rarely the case. Lazar
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full cita-
tion on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be
honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s).
ICSE’18, Gothenburg, Sweden
© 2017 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). 978-x-xxxx-xxxx-x/YY/MM. . .$15.00
DOI: 10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn
et al. [17] examined 269 published cryptography-related vulnera-
bilities. ey found that 223 are caused by developers misusing a
security library, and only 46 result from faulty library implementa-
tions. Egele et al. [12] statically analyzed 11,748 Android apps us-
ing cryptography-related application interfaces (Crypto APIs) and
found 88% of them violated at least one basic cryptography rule.
Chatzikonstantinou et al. [11] reached a similar conclusion by first
analyzing apps dynamically and then performing a manual inspec-
tion for misuses.
Such pervasive insecure use of cryptographic libraries is prob-
lematic for several reasons. First, the misuses of Crypto APIs lead
to devastating data breaches in a large number of applications.
Rasthofer et al. [25] show that virtually all smartphone apps that
rely on cloud services use hard-coded keys. A simple decompila-
tion gives adversaries access to those keys, and to all data that all
these apps store in the cloud. Nadi et al. [22] were the first to in-
vestigate why developers oen struggle to use Crypto APIs. e
authors conducted four studies, two of which survey Java develop-
ers familiar with the Java Crypto APIs. emajority of participants
(65%) found their respective Crypto APIs hard to use. When asked
why, participants mentioned the API level of abstraction, insuffi-
cient documentation without examples, and API design make it
difficult to understand how to properly use Crypto APIs. A poten-
tial long-term solution is redesigning the APIs to provide an easy-
to-use interface for developers that is secure by default. However,
it remains crucial to detect and fix the existing insecure API uses.
When asked about what would simplify their API usage, partici-
pants wished they had tools that help them automatically detect
misuses and suggest possible fixes Nadi et al. [22]. Unfortunately,
approaches based solely on specification inference and anomaly
detection [26] are not viable for Crypto APIs, because—as elabo-
rated above—most uses of Crypto APIs are insecure.
In this paper, we present (a) CrySL, a definition language that
enables cryptography experts to specify the secure usage of their
Crypto APIs, and (b) CogniCryptsast , a compiler that parses and
type-checks CrySL rules and translates them into a static analy-
sis. e analysis automatically checks a given Java or Android
app for compliance with the encoded CrySL rules. CrySL goes be-
yond methods that are useful for general validation of API usage
(e.g., typestate analysis [2, 7, 8, 23] and data-flow checks [1, 5]) by
enabling the expression of domain-specific constraints related to
cryptographic algorithms and their parameters. Our focus is the
Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA), because it is the primary
cryptography API for Java applications [22]. To evaluate CrySL,
we encoded a comprehensive ruleset for the JCA classes and in-
terfaces, and we used the generated static analysis to scan 10,001
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1 SecretKeyGenerator kG =
KeyGenerator . getInstance ("AES");
2 kG.init (128);
3 SecretKey cipherKey = kG.generateKey ();
4
5 String plaintextMSG = getMessage ();
6 Cipher ciph = Cipher. getInstance ("AES/GCM ");
7 ciph.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE , cipherKey );
8 byte[] cipherText =
ciph.doFinal( plaintextMSG .getBytes ("UTF -8"));
Figure 1: An example illustrating the use of
javax.crypto.KeyGenerator to implement data encryp-
tion in Java.
METHOD :=
methname(PARAMETERS)
PARAMETERS :=
varname , PARAMETERS
varname
TYPES :=
alifiedClassName , TYPES
TYPE
CONSTANTLIST :=
constant , CONSTANTLIST
constant
AGGREGATE :=
label | AGGREGATE
label ;
EVENT :=
AGGREGATE
label : METHOD
label : varname = METHOD A: B = C(D) — a single event with
label A consisting of method C, its
parameter D, and return object B
PREDICATE :=
predname(PARAMETERS)
predname(PARAMETERS) aer EVENT
Figure 2: Basic CrySL syntax elements.
Android apps that use the JCA. CogniCryptsast found at least one
misuse in 96% of the apps. For more than 75% of the apps, Cog-
niCryptsast finishes in under 4 minutes.
In summary, this paper presents the following contributions:
• We introduce CrySL, a definition language to specify cor-
rect usages of Crypto APIs.
• We encode a comprehensive specification of correct us-
ages of the JCA in CrySL.
• We present CogniCryptsast , a compiler that translates
CrySL rules into a static analysis to find violations in a
given Java or Android app.
• We empirically evaluate CogniCryptsast on 10,001 An-
droid apps.
Wewill open source our implementation and artifacts onGitHub.
SPEC TYPE;
OBJECTS
OBJECTS :=
OBJECT ; OBJECTS A ; B — a list of objects A and B
OBJECT ; A — a list of the single object A
OBJECT :=
TYPE varname A B — object B of Java type A
EVENTS
EVENTS :=
EVENT ; EVENTS A ; B — a list of events A and B
EVENT ; A — a list of the single event A
FORBIDDEN
FMETHODS :=
FMETHOD ; FMETHODS A ; B — a list of forbidden A and B
FMETHOD ; A — a list of the single forbidden method A
FMETHOD :=
methname(TYPES) => label A(B) => C — a forbidden method named A
with parameter of Type B and replacement C
ORDER
USAGEPATTERN :=
USAGEPATTERN , USAGEPATTERN A , B — A followed by B
USAGEPATTERN | USAGEPATTERN A | B — A or B
USAGEPATTERN ? A? — A is optional
USAGEPATTERN * A* — 0 or more As
USAGEPATTERN + A+ — 1 or more As
( USAGEPATTERN ) (A) — grouping
AGGREGATE
CONSTRAINTS
CONSTRAINTS :=
CONSTRAINT , CONSTRAINTS
CONSTRAINT
CONSTRAINT :=
varname in { CONSTANTLIST } A in {1, 2} — A should be 1 or 2
REQUIRES
REQ PREDICATES :=
PREDICATE
ENSURES
ENS PREDICATES :=
PREDICATE
NEGATES
NEG PREDICATES :=
PREDICATE
Figure 3: A CrySL rule in Extended Backus-Naur Form
(EBNF) [6].
2 MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
roughout the paper, we will use the code example in Figure 1
to motivate the language features in CrySL. Lines 1–3 generate
a 128-bit secret key to use with the encryption algorithm AES.
Lines 5–7 use that key to initialize a Java Cipher object that en-
crypts plaintextMSG. Since AES encrypts plaintext block by block,
it must be configured to use one of several modes of operation. e
mode of operation determines how to encrypt a block based on the
encryption of the preceding block(s). Line 6 configures Cipher to
use the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation [20].
Although the code example may look straightforward, there
are a number of subtle mistakes that render the encryption inse-
cure. First, both KeyGenerator and Cipher only support a limited
choice of encryption algorithms. If the developer passes an un-
supported algorithm to either getInstance methods, the respec-
tive line will throw a runtime exception. Similarly, the design
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of the APIs separates the classes for key generation and encryp-
tion. erefore, the developer needs to make sure they pass the
same algorithm to the getInstance methods of KeyGenerator
and Cipher. If the developer does not configure the algorithms as
such, the generated key will not fit the encryption algorithm, and
the encryption will fail by throwing a runtime exception. More-
over, some supported algorithms are no longer considered secure
(e.g., DES or AES/ECB [14]). If the developer selects such an algo-
rithm, the program will still run to completion, but the resulting
encryption will be insecure.
To use Crypto APIs properly, developers have to take two di-
mensions of correctness into consideration: (1) the functional cor-
rectness that allows the program to run and terminate successfully
and (2) the provided security guarantees. Prior empirical studies
have shown that developers frequently succeed in obtaining func-
tional correctness by, for instance, looking for code examples on
web portals such as StackOverflow [13]. However, they oen fail
to obtain a secure use of Crypto APIs, primarily because most code
examples on those web portals provide insecure solutions [13].
3 CRYSL SYNTAX
Instead of relying on the security of existing usages and exam-
ples, we present an approach in which cryptography experts de-
fine correct API usages in a domain-specific language, CrySL. In
this section, we give an overview of the CrySL syntax elements.
A formal treatment of the CrySL semantics is presented in Sec-
tion 4. Figure 2 presents the basic syntactic elements of CrySL,
and Figure 3 presents the full syntax for a CrySL rule. Figure 4
shows an abbreviated CrySL rule that defines the correct usage of
javax.crypto.KeyGenerator in the example in Figure 1.
3.1 Mandatory Sections in a CrySL Rule
To provide simple and reusable constructs, a CrySL rule is defined
on the level of individual classes. erefore, the rule starts off by
stating the class that it is defined for.
In Figure 4, the OBJECTS section defines four objects to be used
in later sections of the rule (e.g., the object algorithm of type
String). ese objects are typically used as parameters or return
values in the EVENTS section.
e EVENTS section defines all methods that may contribute to
the successful usage of a KeyGenerator object, including three
getInstance methods that are defined by two method event pat-
terns (Lines 17–18). e first parameter of all three methods is a
String objectwhose value states the algorithm that the key should
be generated for. is parameter is represented by the previously
defined algorithm object. Two of the getInstance methods are
overloaded with two parameters. Since we do not need to spec-
ify the second parameter in either method, we substitute it with
an underscore that serves as a placeholder in one combined pat-
tern definition (Line 18). Finally, the rule defines paerns for the
various init methods that set the proper parameter values (e.g.,
keysize) and a generateKey method that completes the key gener-
ation and returns the generated key.
Line 30 defines a usage paern for KeyGenerator using the key-
word ORDER. e usage paern is a regular expression of method
event paerns that are defined in EVENTS. Although each method
9 SPEC javax.crypto.KeyGenerator
10
11 OBJECTS
12 java.lang.String algorithm ;
13 int keySize ;
14 javax.crypto .SecretKey key;
15
16 EVENTS
17 g1: getInstance (algorithm );
18 g2: getInstance (algorithm , _);
19 GetInstance := g1 | g2;
20
21 i1: init(keySize );
22 i2: init(keySize , _);
23 i3: init(_);
24 i4: init(_, _);
25 Init := i1 | i2 | i3 | i4;
26
27 GenKey: key = generateKey ();
28
29 ORDER
30 GetInstance , Init?, GenKey
31
32 CONSTRAINTS
33 algorithm in {"AES ", "Blowfish "};
34 algorithm in {"AES "} => keySize in {128, 192, 256};
35 algorithm in {"Blowfish "} => keySize in {128, 192,
256, 320, 384, 448};
36
37 ENSURES
38 generatedKey [key , algorithm ];
Figure 4: CrySL rule for using javax.crypto.KeyGenerator.
paern defines a label to simplify referencing related events (e.g.,
g1, i2, and GenKey), it is tedious and error-prone to require listing
all those labels again in the ORDER section. erefore, CrySL allows
defining aggregates. An aggregate represents a disjunction of mul-
tiple paerns bymeans of their labels. Line 19 defines an aggregate
that groups the two getInstance paerns. Using aggregates, the
usage paern for KeyGenerator reads: there must be exactly one
call to one of the getInstance methods, followed by an optional
call to one of the init methods, and finally a call to generateKey.
Following the keyword CONSTRAINTS, Lines 33–35 define the
constraints for objects defined under OBJECTS and used as param-
eters or return values in the EVENTS section. In the abbreviated
CrySL rule in Figure 4, the first constraint limits the value of algorithm
toAES or Blowfish. For each algorithm, there is one constraint that
restricts the possible values of keysize.
e ENSURES section is the final mandatory construct in aCrySL
rule. e section specifies predicates to govern interactions be-
tween different classes. For example, a Cipher object uses a key ob-
tained from a KeyGenerator. e ENSURES section specifies what
a class provides, presuming that the object is used properly. For
example, the KeyGenerator CrySL rule in Figure 4 ends with the
definition of a predicate generatedKey with the generated key ob-
ject and its corresponding algorithm as parameters. is predicate
may be required by the rule for Cipher or other classes that make
use of such a key through the optional element of the REQUIRES
block as illustrated in Figure 5.
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39 SPEC javax.crypto.Cipher
40
41 OBJECTS
42 int encmode ;
43 java.security .Key key;
44 java.lang.String transformation ;
45 ...
46
47 EVENTS
48 g1: getInstance (transformation );
49 ...
50 i1: init(encmode , key);
51
52 ...
53
54 REQUIRES
55 generatedKey [key , alg(transformation )];
56
57 ENSURES
58 encrypted [cipherText , plainText ];
Figure 5: CrySL rule for using javax.crypto.Cipher.
We have enriched CrySL with several auxiliary functions. For
example, in Figure 5, the function alg extracts the encryption algo-
rithm from transformation (Line 55). is function is necessary,
because generatedKey expects only the encryption algorithm as
its second parameter, but transformation holds more values than
just the algorithm (e.g., Line 6 in Figure 1).
3.2 Optional Sections in a CrySL Rule
A CrySL rule may contain optional sections that which we will
showcase through the CrySL rule for PBEKeySpec. In Figure 6,
the FORBIDDEN section specifies methods that should not be called,
because calling them is always insecure. PBEKeySpec derives cryp-
tographic keys from a user-given password. For security reasons,
it is recommended to use a cryptographic salt for this operation.
However, the constructor PBEKeySpec(char[] password) does
not allow for a salt to be passed and the implementation in the de-
fault provider does not generate one. erefore, this constructor
should not be called, and any call to it should be flagged. Conse-
quently, the CrySL rule for PBEKeySpec lists it in the FORBIDDEN
section (Line 72). In the case of PBEKeySpec, there is an alternative
secure constructor (Line 68). CrySL allows specifying an alterna-
tive method paern event using the arrow notation (Line 72).
In general, predicates are generated for a particular usage only
if it follows the usage paern defined in the ORDER section and
fulfils all constraints in the CONSTRAINTS section of its correspond-
ing rule. However, PBEKeySpec differs from that paern. e class
contains a constructor that receives a user-given password, but the
method clearPassword deletes that password later. Consequently,
a PBEKeySpec object fulfils its role aer calling the constructor un-
til clearPassword is called. To support this usage, CrySL allows
specifying a method event paern that if called, a predicate is gen-
erated using the keyword after (Line 80). CrySL further supports
killing an existing predicate in the NEGATES section (Line 83).
59 SPEC javax.crypto.spec. PBEKeySpec
60
61 OBJECTS
62 char[] pw;
63 byte[] salt;
64 int it;
65 int keylength ;
66
67 EVENTS
68 c1: PBEKeySpec (pw , salt , it , keylength );
69 cP: clearPassword ();
70
71 FORBIDDEN
72 PBEKeySpec (char []) => c1;
73 PBEKeySpec (char[],byte[],int) => c1;
74
75 ORDER
76 c1 , cP
77 ...
78
79 ENSURES
80 keyspec [this , keylength ] after c1;
81
82 NEGATES
83 keyspec [this , _];
Figure 6: CrySL rule for javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec.
4 CRYSL FORMAL SEMANTICS
4.1 Basic Definitions
A CrySL rule consists of several sections. e OBJECTS section
comprises a set of typed variable declarations V. In the syntax
in Figure 3, each declaration v ∈ V is represented by the syntax
element TYPE varname. e EVENTS section contains elements
of the form (m,v), where m ∈ M and v ∈ V∗. M is the set of
all resolved method signatures, where each signature includes the
method name and argument types. e FORBIDDEN section lists a
set of methods M denoted by their signatures; forbidden events
cannot bind any variables. e ORDER section specifies the usage
paern in terms of a regular expression of labels or aggregates that
are inM. We express this regular expression formally by the equiv-
alent non-deterministic finite automaton (Q,M, δ , s0, F ) over the
alphabet M, where Q is a set of states, q0 is its initial state, F is
the set of accepting states, and δ : Q × M → P(Q) is the state
transition function.
e CONSTRAINTS section is a subset ofC := (V→ O∪V) → B,
i.e., each constraint is a boolean function, where the argument is
itself a function that maps variable names in V to objects in O or
values with primitive types inV .
A CrySL rule is a tuple (T , E,A,C), where T is the reference
type specified by the SPEC keyword, E ⊆ M is the set of forbidden
events, A = (Q,M, δ , s0, F ) ∈ A is the automaton induced by the
regular expression of the ORDER section, and C ⊆ C is the set of
CONSTRAINTS that the rule lists.
Our formal definition of a CrySL rule does not contain the sec-
tions REQUIRES, ENSURES, and NEGATES. ose sections reason about
the interaction of predicates, which requires a different formal treat-
ment that we discuss in Section 4.2.2.
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4.2 Runtime Semantics
Each CrySL rule encodes usage constraints to be validated for all
runtime objects of the reference type T stated in its SPEC section.
We define the semantics of a CrySL rule in terms of an evaluation
over a runtime program trace that records all relevant runtime ob-
jects and values, as well as all events specified within the rule.
Definition 1 (Event). An event is a tuple (m, e) ∈ E of amethod
signaturem ∈ M and an environment e , i.e., a mappingV→ O∪V
of the parameter variable names to concrete runtime objects and val-
ues. If the environment e holds a concrete object for the this value,
then it is called the event’s base object.
Definition 2 (Runtime Trace). A runtime trace τ ∈ E∗ is a
finite sequence of events τ0 . . . τn .
Definition 3 (Object Trace). For any τ ∈ E∗, a subsequence
τi1 ...τin is called an object trace if i1 < ... < in and all base objects
of τi j are identical.
Lines 1–2 in Figure 1 result in an object trace that has two events:
(m0, {alдorithm 7→ "AES", this 7→ okд })
(m1, {alдorithm 7→ "AES",keySize 7→ 128, this 7→ okд })
wherem0 andm1 are the signatures of the getInstance and init
methods of the KeyGenerator class. For static factory methods
such as getInstance, we assume this to bind to the returned ob-
ject. okд denotes the object that at runtime is bound to the variable
kG.
e decision whether a runtime trace τ satisfies a set of CrySL
rules involves two steps. In the first step, individual object traces
are evaluated independently of one another. Yet, different runtime
objects may still interact with each other. CrySL rules capture this
interaction by means of predicates that a rule ensures on a runtime
object. ese interactions between different objects are checked in
a second step against the specification by considering the predi-
cates they require and ensure. We now discuss these steps in more
detail.
4.2.1 Individual Object Traces. e sections FORBIDDEN, ORDER
and CONSTRAINTS are evaluated on individual object traces. Fig-
ure 7 defines the function sato that is true if and only if a given
trace τo for an object o satisfies its CrySL rule. is definition
of sato ignores interactions with other object traces. We will dis-
cuss later how such interactions are resolved. In the following,
we assume the trace τo = τo
0
, ..., τon , where τ
o
i = (m
o
i , e
o
i ). We
will also refer to our example from Figure 1 and the involved rules
of KeyGenerator (Figure 4) and Cipher (Figure 5) to illustrate the
computation. e function sato is composed of three sub-functions:
Forbidden Events (sato
F
). Given a trace τo and a set of forbidden
events E, sato ensures that none of the trace events is forbidden.
satoF (τ
o
, Eo ) :=
∧
i=0...n
moi < E
o
e CrySL rule for KeyGenerator does not list any forbidden
methods. Hence, sato trivially evaluates to true for object kG in
Figure 1.
sato : E∗ × SPEC→ B
[τo , (T o ,Eo ,Ao ,Co )] 7→ satoF (τ
o
,Eo )
∧ sato
A
(τo ,Ao )
∧ sato
C
(τo , Co )
Figure 7: e function sato verifies an individual object trace
for the object o.
-1start 0 1 2
GetInstance Init GenKey
GenKey
Figure 8: e state machine for the CrySL rule in Figure 4
(without an implicit error state).
Order Errors (sato
A
). e second function checks that the trace
object is used in compliance with the specified usage paern, i.e.,
all methods in the rule are invoked in no other than the specified
order. Formally, the sequence of method signatures of the object
tracemo :=mo0 , . . . ,m
o
n , i.e., the projection onto the method signa-
tures, must be an element of the language L(Ao ) that the automa-
ton Ao = (Q,M, δ , s0, F ) of the ORDER section induces. By defini-
tion of language containment, aer the last observed signature of
the tracemon , the corresponding state of the automatonmust be an
accepting state s ∈ F . is definition ignores any variable bindings.
ey are evaluated in the second step.
sato
A
(τo ,Ao) :=mo ∈ L(Ao )
Figure 8 displays the automaton created for KeyGenerator using
the aggregate names as labels. State -1 is the initial state, and state
2 is the only accepting state. Following the code in Figure 1 for the
object kG of type KeyGenerator, the automaton transitions from
state -1 to 0 at the call to getInstance (Line 1). With the calls to
init (Line 2) and generateKey (Line 3), the automaton first moves
to state 1 and finally to state 2. erefore, function sato
A
evaluates
to true for this example.
Constraints (sato
C
). e validity check of the constraints ensures
that all constraints of C are satisfied. is check requires the se-
quence of environments (eo0 , ..., e
o
n) of the trace τ
o . All objects that
are bound to the variables along the trace must satisfy the con-
straints of the rule.
sato
C
(τo , Co ) :=
∧
c ∈Co,i=0...n
c(eoi )
To compute sato
C
for the KeyGenerator object kG at the call to
getInstance in Line 1, only the first constraint has to be checked.
is is because the corresponding environment eo1 holds a value
only for algorithm, and the other two constraints reference other
variable names. e evaluation function c returns true if algorithm
assumes either “AES” or “Blowfish” as its value, which is the case
in Figure 1. e computation of sato
C
for Lines 2–3 works similarly.
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4.2.2 Interaction ofObject Traces. To define interactions between
individual object traces, the REQUIRES, ENSURES, and NEGATES sec-
tions allow individual CrySL rules to reference one another. For a
rule for one object to hold at any given point in an execution trace,
all predicates that its REQUIRES section lists must have been both
previously ensured (by other specifications) and not negated. Pred-
icates are ensured (i.e., generated) and negated (i.e., killed) by cer-
tain events. Formally, a predicate is an element ofP := {(name, args) |
args ∈ V∗}, i.e., a pair of a predicate name and a sequence of vari-
able names. Predicates are generated in specific states. EachCrySL
rule induces a function G : S → P(P) that maps each state of its
automaton to the predicate(s) that the state generates.
e predicates listed in the ENSURES and NEGATES sections may
be followed by the term after n, where n is a method event pat-
tern label or an aggregate. e states that follow the event or ag-
gregate n in the automaton generate the respective predicate. If
the term after is not used for a predicate, the final states of the
automaton generate (or negate) that predicate, i.e., we implicitly
interpret it as after n, where n is an event that leads to a final
state.
In addition to states that are selected as predicate-generating,
the predicate is also ensured if the object resides in any state that
transitively follows the selected state, unless the states are explic-
itly (de-)selected for the same predicate within the NEGATES sec-
tion.
At any state that generates a predicate, the event driving the
automaton into this state binds the variable names to the values
that the specification previously collected along its object trace.
Formally, an event no = (mo, eo) ∈ E of a rule r and for an object
o ensures a predicate p = (predName, args) ∈ P on the objects
eo ∈ O if:
(1) e method mo of the event leads to a state s of the au-
tomaton that generates the predicate p, i.e. p ∈ G(s).
(2) e runtime trace of the event’s base object o satisfies the
function sato .
(3) All relevant REQUIRES predicates of the rule are satisfied
at execution of event no .
For the KeyGeneraor object kG in Figure 1, a predicate is gen-
erated at Line 7 because (1) its automaton transitions to its only
predicate-generating state, state 2, (2) sato evaluates to true as
previously shown for each subfunction and (3) the corresponding
CrySL rule does not require any predicates.
5 DETECTING MISUSES OF CRYPTO APIS
To detect all possible rule violations, our tool CogniCryptsast ap-
proximates the evaluation function sato using a static data-flow
analysis. In a security context, it is a requirement to detect as many
misuses as possible. A drawback of this decision is the potential for
false warnings that originate from over-approximations that the
static analysis requires. In the following, we use the example in
Figure 9 to illustrate why and where approximations are required.
We will show later in our evaluation that, in practice, our analysis
is highly precise and that the chosen approximations rarely lead to
false warnings.
e code example in Figure 9 implements a hashing operation.
By default, the code uses SHA-256 for the operation. However,
84 boolean option1 = isPrime (66); // some non -trivial
predicate returning false
85 byte[] input = "Message ".getBytes ("UTF -8");
86
87 String alg = "SHA -256";
88 if (option1 ) alg = "MD5";
89 MessageDigest md = MessageDigest .getInstance (alg);
90
91 if (input.size() > 0) md.update(input);
92 byte[] digest = md.digest ();
Figure 9: An example illustrating the usage of
java.security.MessageDigest in Java.
93 SPEC java.security .MessageDigest
94
95 OBJECTS
96 java.lang.String algorithm ;
97 byte[] input;
98 int offset;
99 int length;
100 byte[] hash;
101 ...
102
103 EVENTS
104 g1: getInstance (algorithm );
105 g2: getInstance (algorithm , _);
106 Gets := g1 | g2;
107 ...
108 Updates := ...;
109
110 d1: output = digest ();
111 d2: output = digest (input);
112 d3: digest(hash , offset , length);
113 Digests := d1 | d2 | d3;
114
115 r: reset();
116
117 ORDER
118 Gets , (d2 | (Updates+, Digests )), (r, (d2 |
(Updates +, Digests )))*
119
120 CONSTRAINTS
121 algorithm in {"SHA -256", "SHA -384", "SHA -512"};
122
123 ENSURES
124 digested [hash , ...];
125 digested [hash , input];
Figure 10: CrySL rule for java.security.MessageDigest.
if the condition option1 evaluates to true, MD5 is chosen instead
(Line 88). e CrySL rule for MessageDigest, displayed in Fig-
ure 10, does not allow the usage of MD5 though, because MD5 is no
longer secure [14].
e update operation is performed only on non-empty input
(Line 91). Otherwise, the call to update is skipped and only the call
to digest is executed, without any input. Although not strictly in-
secure, this usage does not complywith theCrySL rule for MessageDigest,
because it leads to no content being hashed.
To approximate sato
F
, the analysis must search for possible for-
bidden events by first constructing a call graph for the whole pro-
gram under analysis. It then iterates through the graph edges to
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find calls to forbidden methods. Depending on the precision of the
call graph, the analysis may find calls to forbidden methods that
cannot be reached at runtime.
e analysis represents each runtime object o by its allocation
site. In our example, allocation sites are new expressions and getInstance
calls that return an object of a type for which a CrySL rule ex-
ists. For each such allocation site, the analysis approximates sato
A
by first creating a state-machine. CogniCryptsast then evaluates
the state machine using a typestate analysis that abstracts runtime
traces by program paths. e typestate analysis is path-insensitive,
thus, at branch points, it assumes that both sides of the branch may
execute. In our example, this feature leads to a false positive: al-
though the condition in Line 91 always evaluates to true, and the
call to update is never actually skipped, the analysis considers that
this may happen, and thus reports a rule violation.
To approximate sato
C
, we have extended the typestate analysis
to also collect potential runtime values of variables along all pro-
gram pathswhere an allocated object is used. e constraint solver
first filters out all irrelevant constraints. A constraint is irrelevant
if it refers to one or more variables that the typestate analysis has
not encountered. In Figure 10, the rule only includes one inter-
nal constraint—on variable algorithm. If we add a new internal
constraint to the rule about the variable offset, the constraint
solver will filter it out as irrelevant when analyzing the code in Fig-
ure 9, because the only method that this variable is associated with
(digest labeled d3) is never called. e analysis distinguishes be-
tween never encountering a variable in the source code and not be-
ing able to extract the values of a variable. Using the same rule and
code snippet, if the analysis fails to extract the value for algorithm,
the constraint evaluates to false. Collecting potential values of a
variable over all possible program paths of an allocation site may
lead to further imprecision. In our example, the analysis cannot
statically rule out that algorithm may be MD5. e rule forbids
the usage of MD5. erefore, the analysis reports a misuse.
Handling predicates in our analysis follows the formal descrip-
tion very closely. If sato evaluates to true for a given allocation site,
the analysis checks whether all required predicates for the alloca-
tion site have been ensured earlier in the program. In the trivial
case, when no predicate is required, the analysis immediately en-
sures the predicate defined in the ENSURES section. e analysis
constantly maintains a list of all ensured predicates, including the
statements in the program that a given predicate can be ensured
for. If the allocation site under analysis requires predicates from
other allocation sites, the analysis consults the list of ensured pred-
icates and checks whether the required predicate, with matching
names and arguments, exists at the given statement. If the analysis
finds all required predicates, it ensures the predicate(s) specified in
the ENSURES section of the rule.
6 IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented CogniCryptsast using Xtext [16], an open-
source framework for developing domain-specific languages. Given
the CrySL grammar, Xtext provides a parser, type checker, and
syntax highlighter for the language. When supplied with a type-
safe CrySL rule, Xtext outputs the corresponding AST, which Cog-
niCryptsast then uses to generate the required static analysis. For
the static analysis, we use the programanalysis framework Soot [30].
Soot transforms a given Java program into an intermediate rep-
resentation that facilitates executing intra- and inter-procedural
static analyses. e framework provides standard static analyses
such as call graph construction. Additionally, Soot can analyze a
given Android app intra-procedurally. Further extensions by Flow-
Droid [5] enable the construction of Android-specific call graphs
that are necessary to perform inter-procedural analysis.
Validating the ORDER section requires solving the typestate check
sato
A
. To achieve this, we use IDEal , a framework for efficient inter-
procedural data-flow analysis [28], to instantiate a typestate anal-
ysis. e analysis defines the finite state machine Ao to check
against and the allocation sites to start the analysis from. From
those allocation sites, IDEal performs a flow-, field-, and context-
sensitive data-flow analysis.
e constraints and the predicates require knowledge about ob-
jects and values associated with rule variables at given execution
points in the program. e typestate analysis in CogniCryptsast
extracts the primitive values and objects on-the-fly, where the lat-
ter are abstracted by allocation sites. When the typestate analy-
sis encounters a call site that is referred to in an event definition,
and the respective rule requires the object or value of an argu-
ment to the call, CogniCryptsast triggers an on-the-fly backward
analysis to extract the objects or values that may participate in
the call. is on-the-fly analysis yields comparatively high perfor-
mance and scalability, because many of the arguments of interest
are values of type String and Integer. us, using an on-demand
computation avoids constant propagation of all strings and inte-
gers through the program. For the on-the-fly backward analysis,
we extended the on-demand pointer analysis Boomerang [29] to
propagate both allocation sites and primitive values.
Once the typestate analysis is completed, and all required queries
to Boomerang are computed, CogniCryptsast solves the internal
constraints and predicates using our own custom-made solvers.
7 EVALUATION
We evaluate our implementation of CrySL and CogniCryptsast
by addressing the following research questions:
RQ1: What are the precision and recall of CogniCryptsast?
RQ2: What types of misuses does CogniCryptsast find?
RQ3: How fast does CogniCryptsast return results?
RQ4: How does CogniCryptsast compare to the state-of-the-
art?
To answer these questions, we developed CrySL rules for all
JCA classes. We then applied CogniCryptsast using this ruleset to
statically analyze 10,001Android apps from theAndroZoo dataset [3].
We chose apps that are available in the official Google Play Store
and received an update in 2017. is ensures that we report on the
most up-to-date usages of Crypto APIs. Our project web page lists
all apps in our dataset and our CrySL ruleset to facilitate reproduc-
tion: hp://cryptoapis.wordpress.com
During our evaluation, CogniCryptsast frequently reportedmis-
uses within packages for commonly used libraries across different
apps. To avoid over-counting the same misuses, we excluded the
following common library packages: com.google, com.unity3d,
com.facebook.ads, and com.android.
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Table 1: Correctness of CogniCryptsast warnings.
Total Warnings False Pos. False Neg.
Typestate 27 2 4
Constraints 129 19 0
Total 156 21 4
7.1 Precision and Recall (RQ1)
Setup. To compute precision and recall, two authors of this work
manually checked 50 randomly selected apps from our dataset for
typestate errors and violations of internal constraints. We did not
check for unsatisfied predicates or forbidden events because these
are hard to detect manually. We compare the results of our man-
ual analysis to those reported by CogniCryptsast . Our goal here
is to compute precision and recall of the analysis implementation
in CogniCryptsast , not the quality of ourCrySL rules. We discuss
the laer in Section 7.4. Consequently, we define a false positive
to be a warning that should not be reported according to the speci-
fied rule, irrespective of that rule’s semantic correctness (similarly
for false negatives).
Results. In the 50 apps we inspected, CogniCryptsast detects
228 usages of JCA classes. Table 1 lists the misuses it finds. Overall,
the analysis finds 156 misuses. In particular, it issues 27 typestate-
related warnings, with only 2 false positives, because the analysis
is path insensitive (Section 5). We further found 4 false negatives,
which are caused by initializing a MessageDigest or a MAC object
without completing the operation. CogniCryptsast fails to find
these typestate errors, because the supporting alias analysis times
out, and CogniCryptsast aborts the typestate analysis without re-
porting a warning.
e automated analysis finds 129 violations of internal constraints.
We were able to confirm 110 of them. For the other 19 cases, the
analysis fails to statically extract possible runtime values for cer-
tain variables due to obfuscated code. For such values, the con-
straint solver reports the corresponding constraint as violated. We
have also checked the apps for missed constraint violations, but
were not able to locate any.
RQ1: Our manual analysis shows that our typestate analysis
achieves high precision (92.6%) and recall (86.2%). e constraint
resolution has a precision of 85.3% and a recall of 100%.
7.2 Types of Misuses (RQ2)
Setup. We report the results of analyzing all 10,001Android apps
from AndroZoo. We then use the results of our manual analysis
(Section 7.1) as a baseline to evaluate our findings on a large scale.
Results. CogniCryptsast detects the usage of at least one JCA
class in 4,071 apps (41% of the analyzed apps). Most of these apps
(96%) contain at least one misuse. In total, CogniCryptsast discov-
ers 19,756 individual object traces that contradict the specified rule
paerns. We categorize thesemisuses into the following: typestate
errors (2,669), unsatisfied predicates (3523), forbidden events (159),
and internal constraint violations (11,436).
e violations of internal constraints represent the largest class
of misuses. Approximately 82% of these violations are related to
MessageDigest. In our manual analysis, most violations (89/110)
originate from usages of MD5 and SHA-1. Many developers still use
these algorithms, although both are no longer recommended by
security experts [14]. CogniCryptsast identifies 1,766 (15.4%) con-
straint violations related to Cipher usages. Our manual analysis
confirms that all misuses of the Cipher class are due to using the
insecure algorithm DES or mode of operation ECB. is result is in
line with the findings of prior studies [11, 12, 27].
More than 75% of the typestate errors are caused by misuses of
MessageDigest. rough our manual analysis, we aribute this
high number to incorrect usages of reset. In addition to mis-
using MessageDigest, misuses of Cipher contribute 421 types-
tate errors. Finally, CogniCryptsast detects 89 typestate errors
related to PBEKeySpec. e ORDER section of the CrySL rule for
PBEKeySpec requires calling clearPassword at the end of the life-
time of a PBEKeySpec object. We manually inspected 3 of the re-
portedmisuses and observed that the invocation of clearPassword
is missing in all of them.
Predicates are unsatisfied when CogniCryptsast expects the in-
teraction of multiple object traces but is not able to prove their
correct interaction. With 3,523 unsatisfied predicates reported, the
number may seem relatively large because unsatisfied predicates
accumulate transitively. For example, if CogniCryptsast cannot
ensure a predicate for a usage of IVParameterSpec, it will not gen-
erate a predicate for the key object that KeyGenerator generates
using the IVParameterSpec object. Transitively, CogniCryptsast
reports an unsatisfied predicate for a Cipher object that relies on
the generated key object.
CogniCryptsast also finds 159 calls to forbidden methods. As
only two JCA classes require the definition of forbidden methods
in ourCrySL ruleset (PBEKeySpec and Cipher), we do not find this
low number surprising. A manual analysis of a handful of reports
suggests that most of the reported forbidden methods originate
from the insecure PBEKeySpec constructors (Section 3).
From the 4,071 apps that use at least one JCA Crypto API, 1,757
contain at least one typestate error (43%), 1,079 lack required pred-
icates (26.5%), 155 use at least one forbidden method (3.8%), and
4,001 violate at least one internal constraint (93.7%). Ignoring the
class MessageDigest, 1,119 apps still violate at least one constraint
in other classes.
RQ2: 96% of apps misuse at least one Crypto API. Violating the
constraints of MessageDigest is the most common type of misuse.
7.3 Performance (RQ3)
Setup. CogniCryptsast comprises fourmain phases. It constructs
(1) a call graph using FlowDroid [5] and then runs the actual anal-
ysis (Section 5), which (2) calls the typestate analysis and (3) con-
straint analysis as required, aempting to (4) resolve all declared
predicates. During the analysis of our dataset, we measured the
execution time that CogniCryptsast spent in each phase. We ran
CogniCryptsast once per application and capped the time of each
run to 30 minutes.
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Figure 11: Performance of CogniCryptsast.
Results. Overall, CogniCryptsast times out aer 30 minutes for
only 275 of all 10,001 apps in our dataset (2.75%). Unfortunately,
CogniCryptsast crashed during the analysis of 604 apps in dif-
ferent phases. Figure 11 summarizes the distribution of analysis
times (in seconds) for the four phases as well as the total analysis
time. e numbers are reported across the remaining 9,122 apps
for which the analysis successfully terminates in the alloed 30
minutes. For each phase, the box plot highlights the median, the
25% and 75% quartiles, and the minimal and maximal values of the
distribution.
Across the apps in our dataset, there is a very large variation in
the reported execution time (between 10 seconds and 29.9minutes).
We aribute this to two main reasons. First, apps have different
sizes—reachable methods in the call graph vary between 141 and
30,259 (median: 3,075 methods). e majority of the total analysis
time is spent on call-graph construction. Resolving all declared
predicates takes approximately 0.6 seconds for half of the apps,
with the typestate analysis having amedian runtime of 3.2 seconds.
For more than half of the apps, the value extraction and constraint
resolution finishes in less than 1 second.
RQ3: On average, CogniCryptsast analyzes an app in 108 seconds,
with call-graph construction taking most of the time (76%).
7.4 Comparison to Existing Tools (RQ4)
Setup. We compare CogniCryptsast to CryptoLint [12], the
most closely related tool. Unfortunately, we were unable to ob-
tain access to CryptoLint’s implementation, despite contacting
the authors. However, we were able to use CrySL to reimplement
the original ruleset of CryptoLint. CrySL has generally proven
expressive enough to model the CryptoLint rules, proving it is a
useful specification language beyond the scope of this work.
Our original CrySL ruleset covers all JCA classes. CryptoLint,
however, comprises only six individual rules. For easier distinc-
tion, we refer to our full ruleset for all JCA classes as Rulesetsast,
the original rules CryptoLint uses as Rulesetcl, and our CrySL
version for them as RulesetclCrySL. Both Rulesetcl and Rule-
setclCrySL are available at our project website. Rulesetcl does
not include any typestate properties or forbidden methods, and
hence, can be modelled using only internal constraints and predi-
cates in CrySL. For three out of the six rules in Rulesetcl, CrySL
expresses exactly the checks that CryptoLint performs. e re-
maining three rules (3,4, and 6 in [12]) cannot be directly expressed.
CryptoLint rule 4, for instance, requires non-constant values for
salts in PBEKeySpec. In CrySL such a relationship is expressed
through predicates. However, predicates model correct behaviour
only. erefore, in CrySL we had to further strengthen this Cryp-
toLint rule: we created a rule for PBEKeySpec that requires the
salt to be random. We followed a similar approach with the other
two rules in Rulesetcl. Despite being more strict than Rulesetcl,
RulesetclCrySL ensures a fair comparison betweenCogniCryptsast
and CryptoLint: when comparing the two tools in terms of their
findings, the stricter rules in RulesetclCrySL tend to producemore
warnings than Rulesetcl, which works in favor of CryptoLint.
Results. Using RulesetclCrySL, CogniCryptsast detects usages
of JCA classes in 1,726 Android apps. In total, it reports 6,098 mis-
uses, only a third of roughly 20,000 misuses that CogniCryptsast
identifies using the Rulesetsast. For each of the four types of mis-
uses, CogniCryptsast finds more apps using Rulesetsast. Using
RulesetclCrySL, all reportedwarnings are related to 6 classes, com-
pared to 14 using Rulesetsast. e differences mainly stem from
three types of misuses. As we have pointed out, RulesetclCrySL
does not specify any typestate properties or forbidden methods.
Hence, it does not find approximately 3,000 warnings that Cog-
niCryptsast identifies in these categories using Rulesetsast. Fur-
thermore, while CogniCryptsast reports 11,436 constraint viola-
tions using Rulesetsast, it reports only 1,356 usingRulesetclCrySL.
To our surprise, significantly fewer apps violate four of the six
original rules in Rulesetcl. For example, for CryptoLint rule 1
that forbids the use of ECBmode for encryption, CryptoLint iden-
tified 7,656 apps breaking this rule (65.2% of apps that use CryptoAPIs).
Using RulesetclCrySL, CogniCryptsast identifies 658 usages of
ECB mode in 38.1% of apps that use Crypto APIs. Although a high
number of apps still exhibit this basic misuse, there is a consider-
able decrease compared to previous studies.
RQ4: emore comprehensive CogniCryptsast ruleset detects 3×
as many misuses as CryptoLint in twice as many JCA classes.
7.5 reats to Validity
Our ruleset is mainly based on the documentation of the JCA [24].
Although the authors of this paper have significant domain exper-
tise, our CrySL-rule specifications for the JCA are only as correct
as the JCA documentation. Our static analysis toolchain depends
on multiple external components. Yet, of course, we cannot fully
rule out bugs in the implementation.
Java allows a developer to programmatically select a non-default
cryptographic service provider. CogniCryptsast currently does
not detect such customizations but instead assumes that the default
provider is used. is behaviour may lead to imprecise results, be-
cause our rules forbid certain default values that are insecure for
the default provider but may be secure for a different one.
8 RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss languages that specify API properties
and tools that detect misuses of security APIs.
SpecifyingAPI Properties. ere is a significant body of research
on textual specification languages that ensure API properties by
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means of static data-flow analysis. For example, tracematches [2]
enable runtime-checking typestate properties defined by regular
expressions over runtime objects. Bodden et at. [8, 10] as well as
Naeem and Lhota´k [23] present algorithms to (partially) evaluate
state matches prior to the program execution, using static analysis.
Martin et al. [19] present Program ery Language (PQL) that
enables a developer to specify paerns of event sequences that con-
stitute potentially defective behaviour. A combination of static and
dynamic analyses match the paerns to a given program. A pat-
tern may include a fix that is applied to each match by dynamic in-
strumentation. PQL has been applied to detecting security-related
vulnerabilities such as memory leaks [19], SQL injection and cross-
site scripting [18]. Compared to tracematches, PQL captures a
greater variety of paern specifications, at the disadvantage of us-
ing a flow-insensitive static analysis. PQL serves as the main inspi-
ration for the CrySL syntax. Other languages that pursue similar
goals include PTQL [15], PDL [21], and TS4J [9].
ese languages and their analysis-tool support are different
fromCrySL andCogniCryptsast in threemain aspects. First, these
systems follow a black-list approach by defining and finding in-
correct program behaviour. On the other hand, CrySL rules de-
fine desired behaviour, which in the case of Crypto APIs leads
to more compact specifications. Second, the above languages are
general-purpose languages for bug finding, while CrySL specifi-
cally targets misuses of Crypto APIs, which may seem a limitation
of CrySL. However, the stronger focus on cryptography allows
us to cover a greater portion of cryptography-related problems in
CrySL compared to other languages, while at the same time keep-
ing CrySL relatively simple. ird, CogniCryptsast uses state-of-
the-art static analyses that have superior performance and preci-
sion compared to other static-analysis approaches [28].
Detecting Misuses of Security APIs. roughout the paper, we
have discussedCryptoLint [12], and compared it toCogniCryptsast
in Section 7. Another tool that finds misuses of Crypto APIs is
Crypto Misuse Analyzer (CMA) [27]. e CMA ruleset has signifi-
cant overlaps with ourCrySL ruleset. However, the CMA rules are
limited to misuses related to encryption and hashing. Unlike Cog-
niCryptsast , CMA has been evaluated on a small dataset of only
45 apps. Chatzikonstantinou et al. [11] ran a dynamic checker for
a number of misuses and manually verified their findings on 49
apps. All three studies concluded that at least 88% of the studied
apps misuse at least one Crypto API.
Unlike CogniCryptsast , none of these tools facilitates rule cre-
ation by means of a higher-level specification language. Instead,
the rules are hard-coded into the tool, making it hard for non-
experts to extend or alter the ruleset. Due to its Java-like syntax,
CrySL enables regular developers—including cryptography experts—
to define their own rules. CogniCryptsast then automatically trans-
forms those rules into the appropriate static analysis checks. Fi-
nally, CogniCryptsast includes a typestate analysis that checks
for generally forbidden methods.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present CrySL, a description language for correct
usages of cryptographic APIs. Each CrySL rule is specific to one
class, and it may include usage paern definitions and constraints
on parameter values. Predicates model the interactions between
classes. For example, a rulemay generate a predicate on an object if
it is used successfully, and another rule may require that predicate
from an object that it uses. We also present CogniCryptsast , a
static analyzer that checks a given program for its compliance with
our CrySL ruleset. Applying CogniCryptsast to 10,001 Android
apps, we found 20,000 misuses spread over 96% of the 4,071 apps
that use the JCA.CogniCryptsast terminates successfully in under
2 minutes for more than half of the apps.
In future work, we plan to address the following challenges.
CrySL currently only supports a binary understanding of security—
a usage is either secure or not. We would like to enhance CrySL to
have a more fine-grained notion of security. is notion will allow
for more nuanced warnings in CogniCryptsast . is is challeng-
ing, because the CrySL language still ought to be concise. Also,
CrySL currently requires one rule per class per JCA provider, be-
cause there is no way to express the commonality and variabil-
ity between different providers implementing the same algorithms.
is leads to specification overhead. To address this, we plan to
modularize the language using import and override mechanisms.
Moreover, we plan to consider extending CrySL to support more
complex properties such as using the same cryptographic key for
multiple purposes. Finally, we plan to improve the performance of
CogniCryptsast through incremental static analysis [4].
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